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Highlights: 
• Lithium is key to transitions to clean energy technologies and offers development  
• Bolivian resource nationalism has led to a hybrid mineral development path  
• Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in mineral development need investor confidence 
• Evaluative frameworks for PPPs, and their development impacts, are thus needed 
• For sustainability, PPPs can link with the global Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) 
(8056 words) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we start from the materials central to the global transition to low carbon energy and focus 
on lithium used for energy storage batteries, as a key transition material. We investigate how the desire 
for cleaner technologies has cultivated unusual partnerships between state enterprises and foreign-owned 
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private corporations, often in developing countries rich in alternative energy materials. Focusing on 
Bolivia, we consider the efficacy of vertically integrated mineral development and public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) in developing remote mineral reserves for advanced technologies in developing 
countries. These will be necessary for assuring an economically and ecologically efficient transition 
towards less reliance on fossil fuels internationally. New energy transition governance measures also have 
potential to address broader sustainable development goals and ethical issues, which were high on the 
agenda in the Paris 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21). 
Lithium remains key to low carbon global transitions given its unique properties as the lightest metal with 
unparalleled energy density ability for storage, allowing solar, wind and other non-continuous energy 
development to be more effectively harnessed (Lu et al. 2017). Lithium is also vital for energy efficient 
hybrid and battery-electric cars to reduce pollution. It has been defined as a ‘critical material’ by the 
United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU) and Geoscience Australia (Executive 
Office of the President 2016; Geoscience Australia 2016; Skirrow et al. 2013, 11-2; WWF-Ecofys 2014). 
To meet this demand for lithium, with minimal environmental impact and to facilitate broader sustainable 
development and ethical supply chains, novel approaches to international partnerships in resource 
extraction that transcend ideological biases are needed, and their efficacy evaluated. In this article, we 
discuss the debate on cleaner technologies for lithium production, explain the Bolivian focus and outline 
the Morales Government’s vertically integrated mineral development model. We then explain how PPPs 
link with the UN SDGs and set out some principles for an evaluative framework. Our research aims to 
pave the way towards an evaluative framework, using Bolivia’s lithium as a central case. 
 
2. Lithium production for clean energy technologies  
Markets for cleaner technologies currently favor lithium batteries due to reduced costs and their technical 
and performance advantages over other battery types (IRENA 2015; Climate Council 2015). The market 
has moved away from lead and sodium-sulphur to lithium-ion batteries, based on energy and power 
density, decreased cost and deep discharge cycle life (IRENA 2015, 27). Lithium is also used in many 
products including mobile phones, pharmaceuticals, building tools and aeronautic systems and 
increasingly, for vehicle, household, business and community-scale energy storage. 
Demand for lithium is already resulting in a rush for security of supply (Diss 2017). Even if other materials 
overtake lithium or displace energy storage for intermittent energy source back-up needs, lithium is 
clearly in high demand as a transitional material. Lithium demand has increased at 20 per cent year on 
year (Knight 2014). With a projected rise in electric cars, lithium is predicted by some to exceed supply by 
2023 (Oprey 2017). Lithium’s increasingly cost-competitive use in household and vehicle battery systems 
will also impact globally and in some geographic regions like the EU, the experience may result in a 
lithium bottleneck (Mieema & Moll 2013). During the next two to three decades, with low current rates of 
recycling, lithium supply will come under increasing pressure (Prior et al. 2013; Ali et al. 2017). “That 
leaves battery makers and other end users of lithium largely at the mercy of the big providers” (O’Brien 
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and Nickel 2016). Five companies control 46 per cent of global reserves (Albemarle, Sinchuan Tanqui, 
SQM, FMC, Ganfeng) (Deutsch Bank 2016, 8).  
Lithium production is currently concentrated in Chile, Argentina, Australia, China, the US, Canada and 
Zimbabwe (Prior et al. 2013, 786). Resources are mined either as lithium ore, producing lithium hydroxide 
(for example, Australia) or lithium brine (66% of global lithium mining) producing lithium carbonate (as 
found in the Salar de Uyuni, Bolivian salt flats) (Lu et al. 2017). There are vast amounts of largely 
untapped of brine deposit supply in the ‘lithium triangle’ – Bolivia, Chile and Argentina. Table 1 compares 
lithium brine extraction to hard rock ore extraction mining, including geological features, extraction 
techniques, some economic geology advantages and disadvantages, processing, environmental impact, 
extraction permit process and future extraction technology. 
<<Insert table 1 here>> 
3. Bolivia’s moral imperative message and the challenges of developing lithium 
Bolivia is pertinent for two main reasons: its leadership on arguing developed countries’ international 
moral culpability for climate debt repayment and promotion of lithium as a national resource priority under 
resource nationalism. Its plans for lithium industrialization through vertically integrated mineral 
development and PPPs with foreign corporations, are aimed at harnessing the most environmentally 
appropriate technologies and jobs for development across the lithium supply chain. Since before the 2009 
UN Copenhagen Climate Change Summit,  Bolivia (a vocal member of the Least Developed Countries 
group), has led calls for climate justice and the moral imperative of developed countries to acknowledge 
climate debt repayment for the impact of climate change on some of the world’s poorest countries (Ross 
2013). After the failure of the Copenhagen Summit to acknowledge climate debt justice, Bolivia’s 
President Morales convened the 2010 World People’s Conference on Climate Change held in 
Cochabamba. The Cochabamba Declaration (2010) announced that the North’s repayment of the climate 
debt had to be “the basis for a just, effective, and scientific solution to climate change” (World People’s 
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010). This stance was repeated at the 
Paris 2015 COP21 and further articulated in the 2017 Bonn UN Climate Change Conference COP23  climate 
change adaptation and mitigation discussions (IISD 2017). 
 
President Morales, elected in 2005 as a champion of indigenous self-determination with strong Marxist 
roots, has been a vocal critic of private corporate investment and the neoliberal era that preceded his 
election in 2005. His nationalization programs were widely criticized by the US and its allies and he 
gravitated towards Venezuela and Cuba as key allies (Dávalos 2017).  
 
In 2008, President Morales announced a strategic plan to develop Bolivia’s lithium. Bolivia has the largest 
single reserve of lithium and is predicted to experience a lithium boom around 2020 (Sagárnaga López 
2015). The silver mines of Potosi (exploited for over 500 years), claimed an estimated eight million lives 
through accidents, pollution and disease since their opening in the Spanish colonial period, and have been 
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ranked as one of the 100 deadliest atrocities in human history (White 2011). Thus, the political sensitivity 
around lithium mining and its environmental and social impact is acute in Latin America’s most 
indigenously populated country. (More than sixty per cent of Bolivians identify as indigenous from thirty-
six recognized tribal groups). As Figure 1 shows, most of Bolivia’s lithium deposits are found in 
municipalities with high levels of poverty and the responsible development of the sector has the potential 
for improving the per capita income of these regions.  
 
Figure 1. Map of Bolivia showing lithium deposits in Southern Bolivia mapped against percentage of 
population below the poverty line 
<<Insert Figure 1 here >> 
 
Lithium production in Bolivia is hindered by several challenges.  These include the remote geographic 
location of lithium deposits, a long rainy season and flooding of the salt lakes, high levels of magnesium, 
limited water resources (necessary for processing) and potential negative environmental impacts (see 
table 1). There is also a lack of infrastructure such as roads and of technological expertise in evaporative 
mining (COHA 2009; Revette 2016; Sanderson and Schipani 2016). 
 
In 2014, Bolivia announced the largest state investment in a new mineral in the country’s history. 
President Morales undertook to invest $995 million to develop the Salar de Uyuni’s lithium reserves. The 
world’s largest lithium reserves have been promoted as a panacea for developing one of Latin America’s 
most impoverished countries which has an environmental and social legacy of damaging mineral 
exploitation. Yet, the Morales Government’s plans for developing lithium have created a more complex 
story, partly motivated by a desire to harness the most environmentally appropriate technologies for 
national benefit. In this regard, Bolivia initially partnered with Germany, building on strong historical ties 
between the two countries, to seek new lithium carbonate processing methods that avoid creating 
considerable amounts of sludge – a concern raised by environmentalists. Imprudent mining operations 
could damage the fragile ecology of the 10,000 square kilometer Salar de Uyuni (Boissoneault 2015); and 
could risk undermining the burgeoning Salar tourist industry.  
Lithium mining comes with environmental risks due to intensive use of water (at the expense of 
agriculture), use of toxic chemicals in processing and environmental waste disposal issues. Critics of 
mining note that current practices by Sumitomo Corporation in the controversial San Cristóbal open-pit 
silver, lead and zinc mine, also in the Potosi region, include  large water-intensive (50,000 litres a day) 
and open-pit mining that threatens local soil and water quality (COHA 2009; Minority Rights Group 
International 2012). The slow rate of high-altitude evaporation also impacts on the economic gathering of 
lithium, as well as the size and environmental footprint of ponds developed for evaporation. Evaporation 
rates are lowered by Salar de Uyuni’s rainfall levels, wet season and cooler climate. High levels of 
magnesium in Bolivian lithium deposits may reduce commercial viability as the magnesium must be 
separated.  
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The advent of nanotechnology applications in the lithium extraction process bodes well for separating 
magnesium from lithium and also with reduced water intensity, as noted by Canadian firm Pure Energy 
Minerals (Oprey 2017). It has been suggested that rather than focusing on lithium, the production 
processes should consider magnesium as highly valued co-production alongside lithium (EV World 2017). 
Managing concerns of intellectual property and negotiating revenues of such a production system based 
on its application in Bolivia’s strict state controlled environment will be important challenges. 
 
New, cleaner technologies are being developed, aimed at overcoming many of the technical, chemical and 
environmental hurdles. Rising lithium prices and predicted lithium shortages fuel research and 
development innovation; including experimental technologies in reverse osmosis, which attempt to 
shorten the evaporation time-lag of one-to-two years for high-concentration brine (Martin 2015). Once 
extracted, lithium is processed for use in batteries, including as components and/or electrolytic salt, but 
few companies worldwide have this capacity (COHA 2009; Sanderson and Schipani 2016).  
 
If the challenges of lithium extraction and processing are overcome, lithium industrialization has the 
potential to facilitate Bolivia’s and Latin American neighbors’ transition to renewables. Bolivia has set a 
target of 79 percent renewable energy by 2030, Costa Rica (100 percent by 2030), Uruguay (95 percent 
by 2017), Belize (85 percent by 2027) and Guatemala (80 percent by 2030) (REN21 2016, 109). In 2013, 
Bolivia had one of the lowest electrification rates in South America (88 percent) and an estimated 1.2 
million people without access to electricity, but a target of 100 percent by 2025 (REN21 2016, 151).  
To facilitate lithium production and industrialization, Bolivia has committed to a vertically integrated 
governance model based on PPPs with private sector companies, seen as crucial to implementating new, 
clean technology bracketed to national socio-economic advancement. 
4. Bolivia’s vertically integrated mineral development 
Internationally, the prevailing extraction model in developing countries is that of extractivism, where 
materials are extracted, transported or shipped, with processing, manufacturing and marketing of 
minerals and products taking place elsewhere. Processing countries frequently have low restrictive 
environmental regulation and cheap labor, thus transferring emissions to processing countries whilst also 
depriving source countries of industry development, jobs and technological innovation. Bolivia’s lithium 
production and industrialization plan is aimed at preventing this loss of industry development by declaring 
mineral extraction a national priority and developing value-added manufacture alongside extraction for 
Bolivian jobs and advancement. President Morales dismissed simply exporting refined lithium; promoting 
lithium industrialization spanning the value chain from lithium production, cathode and battery 
manufacturing, to electric vehicles, marketing and export. Morales stated: “We want partners – not 
owners of our natural resources” (COHA 2009). Foreign investors must accept Bolivian state majority 
ownership and a vertically integrated model planned to facilitate battery production domestically. This 
model aims to avoid the historical interface between mineral extraction by foreign corporations, continuing 
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community/indigenous poverty and conflict, environmental damage and resource depletion (Bebbington 
2013; Canessa 2014; Revette 2016).  
The 2009 Bolivian Constitution made significant changes to the relationship between the state, the people, 
and natural resource exploitation. Resources are acknowledged as the property of the people of Bolivia for 
national benefit. Communities are formally guaranteed consultation before resources are exploited in their 
territory (Carbonnier and Zamora 2013; Revette 2016). Bolivia has sought to protect sovereign control of 
its valuable resources by vesting ownership in the state, with the state mining company Comibol, heading 
up lithium industrialization. Comibol has outlined an industrialization plan with three phases: the pilot 
phase (goal: to produce 40 tons of lithium carbonate per month); industrial phase (goal: annual 
production of 30,000 tons); and battery production phase (Revette 2016). In 2016, the Financial Times 
reported that lithium carbonate and potassium chloride were produced at a Comibol-run pilot plant and 
that by 2021, Bolivia aims to export 10,000 tons of lithium carbonate, 168,000 tons of potassium chloride 
and 5,000 tons of lithium cathodes. In August 2016, Bolivia accomplished its first small shipment of 
almost 10 tons of lithium carbonate to China (Sanderson and Schipani 2016).  
 
In terms of governance, lacking technology, expertise and capital to sustainably develop its lithium, 
Bolivia has entered into partnerships with foreign companies with clean energy expertise (Sanderson and 
Schipani 2016). By 2014-2015, the German company K-UTEC Ag Salt Technologies was contracted to 
design a lithium carbonate pilot plant, the Chinese company Linyi Dake Trade was contracted to establish 
a lithium-ion battery pilot plant (Oprey 2017), the Chinese company CAMC Engineering was partnered to 
build a potassium salt industrial plant (Sagárnaga López 2015; Pagina Siete 2015) and the French 
company ECM Greentech signed a contract to build a pilot plant for producing lithium cathode materials 
(La Razón 2015; Revette 2016). The Japanese company, Sumitomo Corporation which owns Bolivia’s 
largest mine, the San Cristobal mine (lead, zinc and silver) at Potosi, has also stated its intention to 
become involved in a lithium mining project (Sumitomo Corporation 2017). 
Information on these partnerships is not readily available. Carbonnier and Zamora (2013, 524) advised 
that: “[i]nformation is limited, leaving room for speculation on the extent to which the [lithium 
industrialization] project will be a success and how far scientific collaboration with foreign partners (Japan, 
South Korea) is being pursued.” A recent field trip by the current authors indicates that Chinese company 
CAMC Engineering has a dominant role in the mining/refinement plant on the Salar; reinforced by the first 
lithium export going to China. The Bolivian Government also contracted Chinese company CITIC Guoan on 
a pilot lithium extraction project and Linyi Gelon New Battery Materials Company to build a battery factory 
in Coipasa (Ellis 2016, 8). Through low interest loans and goods donations such as vehicles, China has 
leveraged substantial foreign investment across a range of sectors in Bolivia. The relationship between the 
Morales Government and the Chinese Government has deepened, but with an unhealthy Bolivian balance 
of trade. The model of using Chinese financial support for national development projects also raises 
problems, including the perceived poor quality of Chinese products and services contracted by the Bolivian 
Government and provided by Chinese companies (Ellis 2016, 12). 
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5. Reinventing Resource Nationalism in Bolivia 
Mining investors from the private sector often identify ‘resource nationalism’ as a key risk in mineral 
development projects worldwide. For example Grimley (2015), based on Ernst & Young’s 2014 report on 
Business Risk Radar for Mining and Metals, warned that “mandated beneficiation and state ownership has 
been the most dramatic pattern of recent resource nationalism”. Bolivia’s politics in the last decade have 
been highly influenced by nationalist populism over natural resources. In 2006, Morales renationalized the 
hydrocarbons industry (Radhuber & Andreucci 2014). This caused disquiet among some international 
investors and in 2016, the Swiss mining company Glencore, announced its arbitration proceedings against 
Bolivia over the nationalization of some of its assets (COHA 2009; O’Brien 2016). 
The private sector defines ‘resource nationalism’ as a form of protectionism limiting the activities of 
external private sector entities in a country’s primary industries. In Latin America, Mares (2010, 6) notes 
resource nationalism is predicated on the notion that “natural resources in the ground or under the sea 
are the property of the nation rather than of a firm or individual who owns the surface area. Therefore, 
natural resources are a ‘national patrimony’ and consequently, should be used for the benefit of the nation 
rather than for private gain.” This often results in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) playing a dominant role 
in resource extraction.  
 
The success of such SOEs is highly variable, with examples of relative success in countries like Chile, and 
financial meltdown in countries like Venezuela. During the past decade, Bolivia has observed the perils of 
mismanaged resource nationalism in its allies, Venezuela and Cuba. Thus it has been revisiting resource 
nationalism with greater willingness to embrace private sector engagement. The focus has shifted from 
domestic ownership to domestic employment, with regulations ensuring there are no more than 15 per 
cent foreign employees in resource development projects. Morales noted that while foreigners are 
welcome to collaborate, the country would retain 60 per cent of revenues from any partnership agreement 
(Lazenby 2016). Although Bolivia had originally hoped to attract major firms such as Sumitomo and 
Mitsubishi of Japan, which showed tentative interest, its success in sealing deals with German K-UTEC Ag 
Salt Technologies and Chinese Linyi Dake Trade for example, is seemingly tempered by slow progress 
(Sanderson and Schipani 2016; EV World 2017).  
 
In a November 2016 call for proposals for constructing and equipping a lithium carbonate plant and later 
industrialization stages of lithium, Bolivian official sources reported interest from at least 26 foreign firms 
(El Periódico International 2017). Firms bidding must however, have overcome skepticism stoked by the 
recent nationalization examples and the government changing the tender closing date three times, 
creating uncertainty. The likelihood of these firms reaching agreements acceptable to the Bolivian state 
(which aims to operate, produce and commercialize resulting products) will require a long-term view of 
resource investments and an integrative approach to Bolivia’s salt flat assets. These may for example, 
incorporate lithium and magnesium production alongside other by-products such as borax, on a large 
scale.  Investment experts are concerned the country is returning to a form of resource nationalism which 
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puts Bolivia at a disadvantage compared with its lithium triangle rivals: Chile and Argentina (Eju 2017b; 
EV World 2017).  
 
Given their tepid experience with PPPs thus far, on March 31, 2017, the Bolivian parliament sought to 
move forward by establishing a new SOE (la Empresa Pública Nacional Estratégica de Recursos 
Evaporíticos [ERE]). ERE is to replace the Gerencia Nacional de Recursos Evaporíticos (GNRE) which has 
been responsible for developing lithium reserves and was overseen by Comibol. ERE is responsible to a 
new Ministry of Energy, separate to the Ministry of Hydrocarbons, which has been tasked with shifting 
Bolivia from gas to renewables, developing electricity generation from clean energy rather than fossil 
fuels, and using lithium batteries for energy storage (Eju 2017a). ERE will hold 100 per cent ownership 
and invest in new (chemical) processing technologies to produce lithium and its by-products (Prensa 
Latina 2017). It can still contract with domestic and foreign firms for lithium industrialization processes, 
but will maintain majority state ownership. Part of the reason for this return to a more public-centered 
investment model has been frustration the country has encountered with technology transfer from foreign 
firms over the past five years. 
 
Thus the Bolivian experiment with public-private partnerships with foreign firms within a resource 
nationalist framework has been underwhelming. Its recent embrace of a more domestically focused 
approach suggests two key elements potentially necessary for effective mineral production and 
industrialization (and for further research): 
 
• Hybrid models of state control and foreign private investment in technology minerals like lithium, 
which have highly volatile and focused markets, require a close research interface between the SOE 
and private firm on new extraction and processing technologies. This requires the SOE to have the 
capacity to engage and implement such research; and may include for instance, a partnership 
contract necessitating that such close research is conducted and outcomes shared. 
 
• SOEs can only be effective in developing technology mineral assets if they have the research 
capacity to develop cost-effective products. This capacity requires investment in mineral research 
and education within the country. 
 
Bolivia may have to wait for some time before it can meet these two criteria for harnessing its lithium 
reserves effectively. An EU funded study (Gottwald, Buch and Giesecke 2012) assessed Bolivia’s higher 
education and research and development in renewable energy as largely absent. This is due to low levels 
of technology transfer, adaptation and innovation; low capacity within university staff and research 
infrastructure; insufficient education/research programs caused by a lack of long-term strategy and 
financing; and little connection between market needs and research and education. Perhaps tellingly, the 
study discussed forms of renewable energy (such as hydropower), but not energy storage such as lithium 
batteries. If Bolivia is not to be reliant on foreign firms for years to come, it will need to develop the 
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capacity to run turn-key plants built by foreign contractors, implement lithium industrialization stages and 
develop its capacity for technology transfer, adaptation and innovation.  
 
There may be opportunities for international organizations concerned with supply security for renewable 
energy infrastructure such as the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), as well as 
development donors to play a constructive role in these arrangements. The country was historically highly 
suspicious of institutions such as the World Bank Group, and particularly the International Finance 
Corporation, which has in turn led to it being deprioritized in development donor activity. Since 2014, 
however, there has been a rise in the government’s collaboration with the bank. In the words of Morales: 
“Previously, the World Bank was our Enemy; Now it is our Friend” (The World Bank 2014). While World 
Bank activities tend to focus on water and sanitation rather than energy, regular bi-monthly training is 
touted as crucial for progress on project success at the community level (author personal communication 
with World Bank official June 2017). 
 
Approaching the matter from a technology transfer perspective may be appealing to both Bolivian 
authorities and development donors. This can promote the upscaling of new prototypes of mineral 
refinement techniques, and build educational capacity in Bolivia for these techniques. This technically-
driven approach may provide an opportunity for science diplomacy to prevent the negative impacts of 
resource nationalism from being realized, and allow for more constructive epistemic engagement between 
public and private sectors. 
 
For developing countries, technology transfer requires adaptation to local raw materials and environmental 
conditions. Upgrading technology requires even higher innovation capabilities. Technology and ‘know-how’ 
for how to do things is entrenched in organizational structures and is not cheap to transfer. A developing 
country’s ability to absorb, adapt and improve technologies depends on the capacity of its ‘national 
learning system’ and ‘technological learning capacity’ in people and organizations. Investments in human 
capital (financial, management, entrepreneurial, technical skills, interaction and information) and 
technical/scientific research and education are crucial. This requires good governance and capabilities in 
the public sector, institutional structures (universities, research and education, government agencies, 
companies, networks) and political support, to acquire and adapt technologies and later, innovate. These 
factors may be weak or missing in developing countries, causing weak research capacity and the need for 
support to develop such capacity (Chandra and Kolavalli 2006, 5, 19).  
 
6. Public-private partnerships, technology transfer and sustainable development  
PPPs can act as mechanisms for technology transfer alongside foreign direct investment and licensing, and 
industry-specific policies, sometimes conducted with donor support. These might include finance for 
foreign-local research and development collaboration, local-content policy, publicly funded research, 
technology transfer agreements, joint ventures, support for industry organizations, science and 
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technology parks, clusters and initiatives to lure expatriates; alongside stable macroeconomic policies, 
rule of law and property rights (Chandra and Kolavalli 2006).  
 
In developing countries like Bolivia, under state-led lithium industrialization, clean technology transfer can 
be incorporated into the aims of PPPs as part of the critical implementation of sustainable development. 
This could underscore environmental, social, political and indigenous rights aspects. In the case of the 
Bolivian Government’s partnerships with foreign companies, public interest outcomes may hinge on the 
extent to which regulatory bodies exist, or their effectiveness and the extent to which scrutiny by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) is effective. Critics have argued that Bolivian state-led lithium 
industrialization does not leave “much space for debate with domestic stakeholders (private sector, civil 
society organizations, the academic community)” (Carbonnier and Zamora 2013, 524). Some foreign 
partner corporations may be subsidiaries of transnational corporations with regional differentiation in work 
practices and standards. Others, for example Chinese companies, may be private or state-owned, bringing 
complex governance relationships to negotiations, contract conditions and project governance. 
 
PPPs have a checkered history in public policy program evaluation, and frequently involve large 
infrastructure projects contracted between governments and private corporations. In developed countries 
from the 1990s onwards, privatization of public corporations such as utilities, led to a raft of regulatory 
reforms at national level aimed at licensing, monitoring, regulatory enforcement and mechanisms to 
address market failure and negative public interest impacts (Bovaird 2004; Hodge et al. 2010). PPPs are 
not always found to be more efficient and better value-for-money (Romero 2015). They can increase the 
risk of corruption with poor transparency, public scrutiny, accountability, governance and redress for 
affected communities (Colebatch 2009; Hodge et al. 2010). Reviews of the World Bank Group’s PPP use 
during 2002-2012 and of literature on PPPs in developing countries, found little evidence that PPPs 
benefited effectiveness and development outcomes (Independent Evaluation Group 2013, 63, 101). 
Governments and financial institutions need to create tools to identify at country-level the circumstances 
under which PPPs are effective (Romero 2015). This requires international assistance for technical support 
and capacity building, internationally accepted PPP guidelines and a common definition of PPPs (Jomo et 
al. 2016).  
In line with sustainable development, development-focused principles and criteria will be important as part 
of establishing and assessing PPPs (Romero 2015; Powell 2016, 2). PPPs can therefore benefit from 
aligning with the UN SDGs, which are leading the global development agenda for 2015-2030.  
 
7. Developing an evaluative PPP framework aligned to the Sustainable Development 
Goals  
PPP guidance materials already exist from such organizations as the EU, World Bank and United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Good governance principles for PPPs should focus on policy, 
capacity-building, legal framework, risk-sharing, procurement, putting people first, and the environment. 
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Within these areas, governments should integrate good governance standards for participation, decency, 
transparency, accountability, fairness, efficiency and sustainable development (UNECE 2008). In 2015, the 
UNECE (2015) stated that this guidance required revisiting in terms of the SDGs, and in specific sectors 
such as sustainable resource use and renewable energy.  
 
A PPP International Standard Development Process was established, with the goal of developing a list of 
PPP standards that align with the SDGs, across a number of sectors including renewable energy (solar, 
wind, hydroelectricity and biomass), off-grid rural electrification and energy efficiency in public 
buildings (UNECE 2015 3, 6). This was accompanied by the First International UNECE PPP Forum which 
addressed ‘people-first’ PPPs as a tool to contribute to the UN SDGs. A 2016 follow-up forum discussed 
key elements of successful PPPs and the challenges in emerging markets and economies in transition 
(UNECE 2016). Importantly, the forum also highlighted promotion of a new culture of good governance 
and a zero-tolerance approach to corruption and bribery. 
 
The United Nations (2015) Third International Conference on Financing for Development brought together 
193 countries to affirm the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which included a set of underlying principles for 
PPPs. These principles aim to promote fair sharing of risks and benefits/returns; avoiding undue subsidies 
to the private sector and undue risks for the public sector; meeting social and environmental standards; 
aligning investment with sustainable development, accountability and transparency across the PPP cycle; 
ensuring debt is tracked and managed; and should adhere to principles of development effectiveness 
(United Nations 2017). In this paper, we propose that for sustainable resource production and use in 
developing clean energy technology, the evaluation of a country’s resource-related PPPs should consider 
two central criteria assessing: (a) PPPs’ contribution to the country’s specific SDG targets and (b) partner-
company’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting and ethical supply chains for public interest 
outcomes. 
 
(a) Assessing PPPs’ contribution to country-specific SDG targets  
Each country could have its own specific key SDG targets to which a PPP can be aligned. Ways that a PPP 
and the partner-company can support these targets, can be found in reports prepared either by UN 
agencies or within the ‘SDG Industry Matrix’ created by the UN Global Compact and KPMG (Global 
Compact & KPMG, 2017a). These reports map various industries onto the 17 SDGs to illustrate each 
industry’s particular strengths and to give specific ideas for private/public sector action for each SDG. A 
related ‘SDG Compass’ also guides companies to define strategic priorities, assess and measure 
performance, set goals and report (Global Compact, GRI & WBCSD 2015). The SDG Compass and industry 
mapping reports could be used as guidance when establishing a PPP and ways the PPP can support priority 
SDGs. They could also guide how the PPP will be assessed regarding its success in supporting the SDGs. 
Of particular relevance to sustainable resource production and industrialization are the industry mapping 
reports  covering  ‘energy, natural resources, chemicals’ (Global Compact & KPMG 2017b), industrial 
manufacturing (Global Compact & KPMG 2016), and mining (UNDP 2016).  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
Some examples of action by ‘energy, natural resources and chemicals’ companies (and thus related PPPs) 
include: 
 
• Goal 7: ‘Ensure access to affordable, reliable and sustainable modern energy for all’ - 
o develop shared energy systems that give surrounding communities access to affordable 
energy;  
o share energy sector knowledge with local governments so they overcome barriers to energy 
access and can develop new solutions;  
• Goal 9: ‘Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive, sustainable industrialization/innovation’ – 
o contribute data and knowledge to local research and development projects to support 
innovation and capacity building; 
• Goal 10: ‘Reduce inequity within and between countries’ – 
o apply impact assessments in remote areas to learn how to design operations that decrease 
inequalities and avoid increasing the risk of conflict (Global Compact & KPMG 2017). 
 
(b) Assessing PPPs in relation to CSR reporting and ethical supply chains for public interest outcomes 
Companies committed to CSR and ethical supply chain reporting are more likely to report on socio-
environmental targets, and the SDGs if they have committed to them, as a means of reporting on their 
contribution to public interest outcomes. Firm’s CSR and supply chains can focus on clean technology 
transfer and support for a developing country’s technical/scientific capacity as part of their contribution to 
sustainable development.  
 
CSR and supply chain reporting are predominantly based on private sector focused voluntary regulation. 
Therefore, NGOs monitoring private sector endeavors in this space tend to act as international watchdogs 
of corporate CSR/supply chain reporting - filling the gap between public global governance and 
monitoring. PPPs in which the partner-company is (at the minimum) encouraged to demonstrate good 
practice in CSR and supply chain reporting, are also more likely to demonstrate good practice in 
sustainable development and technology transfer.  
 
Beyond companies fulfilling basic responsibilities in CSR (such as committing to the UN Business and 
Human Rights Guidelines, and reporting through the Global Reporting Initiative), there are regulatory 
frameworks of further relevance to PPPs in mineral production and industrialization. These frameworks 
cover ‘conflict minerals’ and ‘critical materials’. Conflict minerals can fund conflict and human rights 
abuses due to their being mined in conflict-prone areas such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Examples are wolframite (tungsten); columbite-tantalite (also known as coltan from which tantalum is 
derived); cassiterite (tin); and gold; or their derivatives (OECD 2016). Critical materials are critical for 
developing clean energy and high-technology products (Executive Office of the President 2016). It is 
crucial their high demand does not risk future damage environmentally or socially, in communities.  
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Examining the efficacy of a PPP in terms of partner company practices and reporting on conflict minerals 
and critical materials may strengthen a PPPs’ sustainable development outcomes. Examples of voluntary 
regulatory frameworks that PPPs can utilise are the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (OECD Guidance 2016) and Guidelines for 
Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments, developed by the China Chamber of Commerce of 
Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers and Exporters (Banyiyezako 2015).  
 
A noticeable gap in reporting by private companies involved in mining and clean technology development, 
is the lack of publicly available information showing if they have CSR or ethical supply chains policies, or 
policies on conflict minerals and critical materials. For example, a search for CSR, sustainability, conflict 
minerals or critical materials-related policies was undertaken on the websites and listed policy documents 
of the four companies identified as linked to Bolivia’s lithium development. CAMC Engineering Co. Ltd 
advocates “social responsibility”, however the company states it focuses on philanthropy (CAMC 2017). 
Philanthropy is worthy, but does not represent embedded social and environmental responsibility within 
the firm’s core business practices or its commitment to UN SDGs. There is little information on the 
website, but the company highlights its aim to benefit shareholders and employees (CAMC 2017b). The 
other companies, K-UTEC Ag Salt Technologies (K-UTEC 2017), ECM Greentech (ECM Technologies 2017) 
and Linyi Dake Trade (B2BMit 2017), display no relevant policies on their websites. 
 
Hybrid models of PPPs around mining can be found in neighboring Chile which also has major lithium 
reserves. The country has published a strategy for PPPs that includes research and development of new 
technologies in partnership with science and its technology research organization.  Chile went through a 
deliberative process with a National Lithium Commission and laid out key targets for its PPP program (BTG 
Pactual 2016). In order for such an approach to work in Bolivia, there also needs to be concomitant 
investment in science and technology education and an effort to prevent a ‘brain drain’ from the country. 
Chile’s lithium plan is a direct government partnership with a signed protocol between state mining 
company Codelco and the country’s innovation and economic growth organization, Corfo. Working in 
tandem, they are more likely to provide foreign private investors with a long-term incentive to move 
forward with viable projects that reap development dividends, rather than boutique frontier investments 
aimed at merely testing market stability. 
 
8. Conclusion 
A key vulnerability of the transition from a fossil fuel driven economy to a low carbon economy, is the 
international governance void across crucial mineral supply chains. Countries such as Bolivia that are well-
resourced in critical materials are vulnerable to such a governance void and to the downfalls of public-
private partnerships documented over the last twenty years. Lithium mining to support the global demand 
for electric storage devices could bring development to neglected parts of the country and fiscal flows to 
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the economy, but could also detract from alternative development paths such as eco-tourism in mining 
regions.  
A well-planned approach to developing these minerals through effective governance of the public and 
private sector and on trial in Bolivia via PPPs, could help develop a domestic clean energy industry. This 
could also could bring electricity and battery storage to the 1.2 million households without it. Furthermore, 
if there is appropriate coordination with research organizations, academia and international donors, there 
is potential to use this resource boom as a means of delivering other sustainable development goals, 
including education, clean water delivery and improvement in Bolivian quality of life. 
Bolivia may only have a short window of opportunity to exploit its resource advantage, as lithium batteries 
may be overtaken by other new technology in a rapidly changing competitive market in energy storage 
(COHA 2009; OECD 2016b). The international and Bolivian desire for clean technologies and sustainable 
development in the context of Bolivia’s calls internationally for carbon debt reduction and resource rights, 
has cultivated unusual partnerships between state enterprises and foreign-owned private corporations. 
This demands analysis of PPPs’ efficacy for developing remote mineral reserves required for advancing the 
technologies necessary to facilitate global energy transitions  and address broader sustainable 
development goals. Our research aims to pave the way to an evaluative framework for this model of PPPS 
and vertically integrated mineral development in developing countries. The evaluative framework can 
potentially be used internationally to support best-practice application of clean technologies for resource 
production.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Lithium Brine and Hard Rock Ore Extraction Mining 
 
Attribute Lithium Brine extraction Hard Rock Ore Extraction 
Geologic feature 
(global % of lithium) 
 
Salt flat precipitates 
(66%) 
eg. Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, 
China, Tibet 
Mineralized ore in rocks  
(44%) 
eg. Australia 
Extraction technique Evaporation pools Crushing, roasting and leaching 
lithium ore 
Economic  Geology 
Advantages 
Easier to explore; softer rock in 
flat arid barren areas; shallower 
drilling for geophysics; faster 
production set-up; less capital 
required.  
 
Faster processing schedule; 
lower start-up costs; additional 
costs for upgrade to battery 
grades 
Economic Geology 
Disadvantages 
May be in remote areas 
requiring longer transport, 
power, water and labor 
networks; Slower production 
schedule (evaporation time) 
 
Topographical challenges 
harder and more complex to 
explore and sample rocks for 
viability 
 
Processing Evaporation of brines pumped 
to surface evaporation pools; 
Pumped to processing plant for 
extraction of boron and 
magnesium 
Treated with sodium carbonate 
(soda ash) to precipitate 
lithium carbonate 
Hydrometallurgical processes; 
Crush and heat ore in rotary 
kiln; Mixing with sulphuric acid, 
roasting; removal of 
magnesium and calcium; 
adding soda ash, filtering, 
drying to produce lithium 
carbonate 
 
Environmental 
impact 
 
Large water usage 
requirements; chemical 
concentrates input and 
disposal; Biodiversity concerns 
 
Deep land excavation; Acid 
usage and drainage concern; 
Air emissions of roasting 
process; Biodiversity concerns 
Extraction permit 
process 
‘Placer deposits’ easier to 
permit due to reduced 
ecological impact  
 
More complex environmental 
permitting process due to 
impacts 
Future extraction 
technology 
Mechanical brine extraction 
Not proven commercially 
Clay (similar process to 
spodumene) 
Not proven commercially 
Sources: Bell (2017); Dajin Resources (2015); Desjardins (2017) 
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